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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JERRY SINE and DORA A. SINE, his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
- vs. -
HENR'! C. HELLAND, Director of 




BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The defendants-appellants herein have appealed 
to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah by an 
interlocutory appeal from an order of the Honorable 
Marcellus K. Snow, Judge of the Third Judicial Dis-
;rd Court, Salt Lake County, denying a motion to 
dismiss respondents' complaint, wherein respond-
ents seek 3. writ of mandamus directing appellants 
10 commence a condemnation proceeding to _estab-
lish damages, if any, and compensation for the 
taking of property to be the subject of said condem-
nation proceeding. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On September 21, 1965, respondents filed an 
2 
amended complaint in the Third Judicial Distn, 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. c; 
October 27, 1965, the appellants filed a motion. 
dismiss the amended complaint, said motion beh 
heard on November 22, 1965, before the Honorab;i 
Marcellus K. Snow, Judge, who after argumentthe;f 
on denied appellants' motion with prejudice i 
petition was filed in this court, pursuant to Rule n1L: 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on Janua.ry E 
1966, praying that this court review the interlocutor. 
ruling of the lower court denying appellants' motio:. 
to dismiss. This court, by order dated Februar1 \ 
1966, granted the petition for interlocutory appei 
and this brief is submitted in support of the issuei 
raised by the appellants in their petition and in ilie 
motion to dismiss the amended complaint in ilie 
lower court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek reversal of the lower court'~ 
order denying their motion to dismiss the amendec 
complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1965, respondents Jerry SinE 
and Dora A. Sine, his wife, filed an amended com 
plaint in the Third Judicial District Court in andlor 
Salt Lake County (Case No. 156331), against He~; 
C. Helland, Director of Highways, Weston E. Ham~ 
ton Chairman Elias J. Strong, Francis Felch, Cle.~ 
' ' h Sta!D Church and Ernest H. Balch, members oft e , 
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Road Commission, and Phil L. Hansen, Attorney 
General of the State of Utah, for the purpose of re-
quiring them to institute an action under the emin~nt 
d:::ima.in statutes of the State of Utah, condemmng 
respondents' property in Block 61, Plat "C", Salt 
Lake City Survey, and permit the respondents to 
p:ove damages and receive compensation for the 
illeqed damage of said property. 
The appellants in October, 1965, filed their mo-
Uon to dismiss on the grounds that (1) the appellants 
had not consented to be sued and were acting in 
ir.eir governmental function as the Director of High-
·ways, the State Road Commission, and the Attorney 
General of the State of Utah. and such were immune 
from suit, and (2) that the matters pleaded in re-
spondents' complaint had been fully litigated in the 
State of Utah v. Joseph Parker. et al., 13 Utah 2d 65. 
368 ~.2d 585. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ACTING THROUGH ITS 
ROAD COMMISSION, IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT FOR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGE TO REAL PROPERTY, NO 
PART OF WHICH IS EXPROPRIATED FOR A PUBLIC 
IMPROVEMENT. 
It is rather evident from a reading of the con:.-
plaint that the pleaders seek to recover damages 
against the State of Utah consequentially resultin9 
from the raising of a public improvement on prop-
4 
erty, no part of which was owned or possessed r 
the respondents. · 
Respondents allege in their amended compi,. 
(R. 17): 0.L 
"~3.. The S!ate of Utah and its State Roi, 
Comm1ss10n and its Attorney General were and ,, 
free to includ~ and s~ould include as defendants3, 
a condemnation action persons situated as ar 
plaintiffs with reference to the above described pro; 
erty. 
"24. The United States of America and tn-
State of Utah and its Highway Department hait 
funds available for the payment of damage claims(, 
such persons as the plaintiffs except that the Stateo 
Utah hides behind a claim of sovereign immunih 
which is effectuated through failure to name sue~ 
persons as are known to be threatened with damai~ 
as parties defendant in condemnation actions a;r; 
by refusal to negotiate to conclusion for the dama~, 
such persons will suffer or by recognizing the dama~f 
actually suffered by such persons after the highwa1 
has been wholly or partially constructed." 
The law in this jurisdiction has been firm]· 
established by a host of decisions issuing from th:: 
court that the State of Utah, acting in its sovereigr 
capacity, may not be sued without its consen: 
Wilkinson v. State of Utah, 48 Utah 483, 134 Pac. ozi 
( 1913); Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U.t' 
100, 349 P.2d 157 (1960); Fairclough v. State Roa~ 
Commission, 10 U.2d 417, 354 P.2d 104 (1960); a.nc 
State v. Parker, 13 U.2d 65, 368 P.2d 585 (1962). 
In the Springville Banking case, supra, thelanc 
owner brought an action in mandamus to requ~; 
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,,,embers of the State Road Commission to initiate 
1 ~crit domain proceedings for damages alleged]y e;fDU!~-' 
orJduceci by reason of impairment of access to thefr 
· uf business. This court held that sovereign im-
ff:Lnitv was a defense to the action brought by the 
: 6 i:c!o;~'ner and that the case was dispositive on that 
" ... Can plaintiff, employing the extraordinary 
writ of mandamus, compel the State to pay damages, 
when, because of sovereign immunity, it could not 
have done so in a direct suit against the State or the 
Road Commission?" 
(349 P.2d at 158) 
The court answered the question posed by saying: 
''We believe and hold that the procedure chosen 
by plaintiff was an effort indirectly to do that which 
repeatedly we have held could not be done directly, 
which is dispositive of this case on that ground." 
( 349 P.2d at 158) 
In "he Fairclough case, supra, the landowners 
:iJleged. as do the respondents in the instant case, 
:hat the construction of the public highway facility 
had damaged their property which abutted upon 
the highway right of way. The State Road Commis-
sion filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, based 
upon its immunity from suit for consequential dam-
Jqes to property, no part of which was placed to the 
i::ubiic use. This court declared that absent a decb.-
r~t::m by the Legislature to the contrary, immunity 
'
1 the sovereignty was paramount and a proper de-
ense to the action. The court stated: 
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"As to 1), consistently and historically h 
ruled that the State may not be sued wi;e av, 
consent; taken the view that Art. I, Sec. 22 ouft its 
C t •t t• . t If . 0 Ol, ons i u 10n is no se -executing, nor does it · 
consent to be sued, implied or otherwise· and th gtivt 
h t . l . l . ' a In secure sue consen is a eg1s ative matter a · 
ciple recognized by the legislature itself." ' Ptlli 
(354 P.2d at 106) 
In State v. Parker. supra, the court said: 
"On numerous occasions we have held that sue'~ 
damage is not recoverable because of the State's 1~ 
munity. Fairclough v. Salt Lake County, a case moit 
similar to this one, is our last pronouncement in thi, 
respect. Therein are cited our previous decision, 
which we are disinclined to reverse. Contrariwise, w• 
consider and hold that the Fairclough case and tho& 
cited therein are dispositive here, to which authoritie1 
we refer the reader without needless repetition." 
(368 P.2d at 58) 
Consequently, the respondents' complaint shou)8 
have been dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE MATTERS PLEADED IN THE AMENDED 
COMPLAINT ARE RES JUDICATA. 
In Wheadon v. Pearson. 14 U.2d 45, 376 P.2d9{ 
(1962), the court quoted and reaffirmed the doctrine 
as to res judicata as set forth in East Millcreek Water 
Co. v. Salt Lake City. 108 Utah 315, 159 P.2d 8630945 
as follows: 
" there are two kinds of cases where tni 
doctrine of res judicata is applied: In th~ one ilie 
former action is an absolute bar to the mamtenan~ 
of the second; it usually bars the successful pa· 
7 
. well as the loser; it must be between the same a~rties or their privies; it applies not only to points 
p nd issues which are actually raised and decided ~herein but also to such as could have been therein 
adjudicated, but it only applies where the claim, de-
mand or cause of action is the same in both cases." 
In the matter now before this court, the defense 
cii sovereign immunity was raised in the lower 
court. The respondents in State v. Parker, supra, Jerry 
Sme and Dora P. Sine, his wife, are the respondents 
in the present action. In addition, the Utah State 
Road '.:::ommission, the appellant in Parker, is the 
appellant m the present action. The allegations in 
Parker and this action are identical. Both claim con-
sequential damage as the result of the building of 
the same interstate highway abutting the same 
motel and pr'.)perty. The only difference being that 
in Parker, the respondents here were counter-
daimants. 
The court in Parker held that: 
"As to Sine's argument that he, being a defend-
ant, may counterclaim and recover, is answerable by 
the simple and authoritative conclusions that neither 
under our rules or elsewhere, can a counterclaimant 
cast himsel£ in any other role than that of a plaintiff. 
If Sine, as plaintiff, had sued the State in this case, 
he would have been unable to proceed under the 
authorities referred to above. Since a counterclaim 
mu~t b_e invested with all the requisites of a com-
plamt, it would strain reason to conclude that it would 
have any attribute that would alter nonresult into 
result." 
(368 P.2d at 587) 
Respondents' action is clearly barred. 
8 
CONCLUSION 
The order of the Third District Court, denyin, 
the motion of the State of Utah to dismiss the con' 
plaint, should be reversed. ·· 
Respectfully submitted 
I 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utan 
Attorney for Appellants 
~II 
